ABSTRACT The security of mobile communication largely depends on the strength of the authentication key exchange protocol. The 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) Group has standardized the 5G AKA (Authentication and Key Agreement) protocol for the next generation of mobile communications. It has been recently shown that the current version of this protocol still contains several weaknesses regarding user localization, leakage of activity, active attackers, and in the presence of malicious serving networks, leading to potentially major security leaks. We propose a new version of the 5G AKA protocol to overcome all the currently identified weaknesses in the protocol. In the new protocol, we replace the sequence numbers with random numbers, making it possible to drastically reduce the number of required communication phases and steps in the protocol. The usage of random numbers for the 5G AKA protocol is possible since the current Universal Subscriber Identity Modules (USIMs) are now capable of performing randomized asymmetric encryption operations. Moreover, the proposed protocol provides two additional security features, i.e., postcompromise security and forward security, not present in the current 5G AKA protocol. Finally, we evaluate the performance, both computation and communication efficiency, of the proposed AKA protocol and show its improvements compared to the current 5G AKA protocol.
I. INTRODUCTION
Due to the anytime anywhere connectivity feature and popularity of smart phones, mobile communication is becoming extremely popular among many users. Telecommunication systems have already evolved from 2G to 3G and then to 4G to facilitate the continuously increasing demand in voice and data traffic. Simultaneously, the variety and requirements of supported mobile network services are ever increasing with each generation. Today the telecommunications network support a huge set of network services such as HD video streaming, online gaming, mobile health care, mobile
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banking, mobile cloud services and many more. Moreover, booming vertical industries such as vehicle network, Internet of Things (IoT), Augmented and Virtual Reality (AR/VR), Industrial Internet, e-health, and smart grid are demanding fast yet ubiquitous network access via telecommunication to gain a new momentum [1] . As a result, mobile networks will have to support more than 1,000 times today's traffic volume by the year 2020 [2] , [3] . Therefore 5G, which is the next generation of the mobile telecommunication networks, needs to offer greater capacity, higher-speed, more dynamicity and more cost-efficiency than any generation has provided before [4] .
The 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) group, responsible for the standardization of 3G, 4G, and 5G technologies, designed the Authentication and Key Agreement (AKA) protocol that aims at mutually authenticating a device equipped with a Universal Subscriber Identity Module (USIM) card with networks, and establishing keys to protect subsequent communications. This protocol is notably implemented in all 3G and 4G USIM cards and cellular networks worldwide [5] .
The 5G specification from 3GPP has put a lot of emphasis on the privacy issues, relating to subscribers and their data, in accordance with the new privacy regulations such as EU (European Union)'s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) framework [6] - [8] . As a consequence, an updated version of the AKA protocol has been defined by 3GPP for 5G communication. The latest version v15.1.0 of Release 15 of the Technical Specification (TS) has been released in June 2018 [9] . This version has been thoroughly reviewed by means of formal verification in [10] and several major issues have been revealed. These security concerns are related to user localization, leakage of activity, impact of active attackers and also the presence of malicious Serving Networks (SN) while roaming.
Especially, roaming can happen very frequently in the 5G network because of the popularity of local 5G networks or micro 5G operators [11] - [13] . Due to this new trend, the possibility of encountering a malicious serving network is quite high in 5G. Most of these local 5G operators or micro operators do not have a high level of security similar to the main Mobile Network Operators (MNOs). Therefore, it is relatively easy to attack local 5G networks or micro 5G operators.
Our Contribution: In this paper, we propose a novel version of the 5G AKA protocol to overcome all the currently identified weaknesses in the protocol [10] . We first summarize all the currently known weaknesses and instead of giving separate ad hoc solutions for each of them, we propose a new version of the AKA protocol, able to address all the issues in a combined approach. Moreover, the new protocol not only offers resistance against these identified weaknesses, but also provides a more efficient and secure solution than the current 5G AKA protocol. In the new protocol, we replace the sequence numbers with random numbers, making it possible to drastically reduce the number of required communication phases and steps in the protocol. The usage of random numbers for the 5G AKA protocol is possible since the current USIMs are now capable of performing randomized asymmetric encryption operations [10] . Moreover, the proposed protocol provides two additional security features, i.e. postcompromise security and forward security, not present in the current 5G AKA protocol. We presents a non-monotonic logic-based verification proof for verifying the proposed scheme. Finally, we evaluate the performance of the proposed AKA protocol and compare it with the current 5G AKA protocol. Since at each step, the proposed protocol needs to perform the same type and approximately the same amount of operations as the latest 5G AKA protocol, the impact of replacing the current 5G AKA protocol with our protocol from an implementation point of view will be minimal. The paper's outline is as follows. Section II presents an overview of relevant related work. Section III deals with preliminaries on the 5G AKA protocol. In Section IV, we present our protocol, followed by a formal security proof in Section V. An extended discussion on the design choices in Section VI is provided. The comparison in performance between our proposed protocol and the current AKA protocol is discussed in Section VII. Finally, we end the paper with some conclusions in Section VIII.
II. RELATED WORK
Several survey papers on the security attacks related to 5G networks are available in literature [14] - [18] . However, this paper focuses on the latest version of the AKA protocol, proposed for 5G. For this protocol, some of the older identified attacks still hold. For instance, there are the attacks of [19] - [21] that exploit the usage of the different types of failures, MAC based or synchronization based, to track a specific subscriber. In the attack, an old authentication challenge already received by the subscriber needs to be replayed and identification of the same subscriber is obtained in case a synchronization failure is replied.
For the more recent AKA protocol, the authors in [22] identified a new attack where the complete activity pattern of a user can be revealed. These type of attacks are also called the activity monitoring attacks. The attack exploits the lack of randomness and the use of XOR in the concealed sequence number. By cleverly choosing several time-stamps to collect data, the confidentiality of the sequence numbers is broken. As these sequence numbers are linked with the activity of the user, the attacker is able to learn the typical service consumption of targeted subscribers.
In [10] , the first formal evaluation has been performed on the AKA protocol using the verification tool Tamarin [23] . This allowed a thorough security check and revealed some additional weaknesses of the newly proposed protocol. In particular, they raised the fact that several security assumptions are missing in order to meet some critical security goals as specified in the standard. For instance, the addition of a successful key confirmation round is required in order to guarantee that the required security features are obtained and that the different communication links are bound with each other.
In this paper, we propose a novel 5G authentication protocol or 5G AKA protocol to improve the resistance against all the identity attacks mentioned in above literature.
III. PRELIMINARIES A. AKA PROTOCOL
We provide a simplified description of the AKA protocol, proposed for the latest version v15 to be used in the 5G networks [9] . We focus on the message flow and corresponding content of the core protocol, which is common for all variants of the AKA protocol. The cellular network architecture is built up of the following three main components, as demonstrated in Figure 1 .
• The User Equipment (UE), typically smart phones or IoT devices, is carried by the subscriber. The UE is uniquely identified by its Subscription Permanent Identifier (SUPI), stored in the Universal Subscriber Identity Module (USIM). Note that the SUPI in 5G plays the same role as the International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI) in pre-5G standards. Besides the SUPI, the USIM also stores subscriber-related information and implements security functions required to run the AKA protocol. The term subscriber is used for referring to the combination of UE and USIM.
• A Home Network (HN) is responsible for the registration of their subscribers and their authentication.
• The Serving Network (SN) refers to the network to which the UE may be attached, different from its HN. This is for instance the case when the subscriber travels to locations where no base station of the HN is available, e.g. roaming. We want to note that SNs and HNs are composed of several sub-entities (e.g. separate database and authentication server at the HN). However, this level of detail is not required to explain the main structure of the AKA protocol providing the different security features. In addition, it is also important to take into account that in the description of the protocol the UE and SN communicate over an insecure channel, while the SN and HN communicate over an authenticated channel, providing confidentiality, integrity, authenticity, and replay protection, as mentioned in the standard [9] -[TS 33.501, Sec. 5.9.3]. Pre-5G deployments such as 4G-LTE (Long Term Evolution) had also used secure communication channels, such as IPSec [24] , [25] between HN and SNs. Therefore, it is recommended to use similar secure channels in 5G as well [9] .
The USIM of the UE possesses several cryptographic capabilities including symmetric key encryption, MAC (Message Authentication Code) operation, EC (Elliptic Curve) multiplication and addition. In addition, it also stores the following parameters, which are integrity and confidentiality protected within the UE using a tamper resistant secure hardware component [9] -[TS 33.501, Sec. 5.2.4].
• The public key pk HN of the HN.
• Subscription Permanent Identifier (SUPI). This is a unique and permanent subscriber identity. Note that in 5G, the UE never reveals this parameter in plaintext because of privacy reasons. Instead, it encrypts the SUPI together with a random number, using the public key of the HN. This encrypted value together with the identity of the HN forms the so-called Subscription Concealed Identifier (SUCI).
• K . This parameter represents a unique (linked with the SUPI) and permanent secret symmetric key between the UE and its corresponding HN.
• Sequence Number (SQN UE ). The sequence number is used to protect against replay attacks and is updated after each successfully received request of the SN. On the other side, the corresponding HN of the UE also securely stores for each UE the symmetric key K and the associated sequence number SQN HN . Note that SQN UE and SQN HN are not necessarily the same due to some potential desynchronization. In addition, the private key of the HN is also stored in an integrity and confidentiality protected environment. The functions f 1 , f * 1 , f 5 , f * 5 used in the authentication process are one-way keyed cryptographic functions, which are completely unrelated and or providing protection against integrity and confidentiality [10] . The exclusive-or (XOR) operation is denoted by ⊕. Challenge() and KeySeed() are complex Key Derivation Functions (KDFs) as specified in [9] . Note the difference in notation between xMAC and MAC in order to make a difference between the result of the computation from the user and the expected result (called xMAC). The user calculates the MAC operation and afterwards compares it with the received xMAC. The same principle holds for xRes and hxRes, SQN and xSQN. The main goal of the protocol is to establish mutual authentication between UE and SN, together with the derivation of a session key determined by the HN, called K SEAF . Figure 2 presents a high level description of the different steps in the basic AKA protocol. The secure channel between HN and SN is explicitly highlighted on the figure in order to emphasize that the sensitive parameters (SUCI , K SEAF , hxRes, . . .) are securely sent over this channel.
B. ASSUMED ATTACK MODELS
As mentioned before, the attack model is limited to the channel between subscribers and SNs. This channel is subject to passive attackers, able to eavesdrop, monitor, and collect data sent over the channel. However, also active attackers are assumed, who can in addition intercept, manipulate, modify, replay, or even destroy data sent over the channel. While a passive attacker only listens over the channel, an active attacker needs to set up a fake base station to send and receive messages. Although, at the moment, there is no 5G-specific hardware publicly available yet, it is expected to become also easily feasible in the near future as has been the case with 4G, where open-source software and hardware became freely available [26] , [27] . Therefore, the presence of active attackers needs to be considered. Furthermore, with respect to compromised parties, we assume both malicious subscribers and malicious SNs. The last one is possible as mentioned before. Here, the attacker is able to establish and get access to an authenticated channel with the HN in order to authenticate some subscribers. Such situation can happen in case of roaming for instance. In fact the scenario of an active attacker and malicious SN is very similar. The main difference between both is that a malicious SN can be in the possession of a list of legitimate USIMs and corresponding session keys. Another VOLUME 7, 2019 possibility is that the attacker is in the possession of genuine USIMs and compromised USIMs. For those compromised subscribers, the attacker has access to all secret values stored in the USIMs, i.e., SUPI, K, and SQN.
C. SECURITY REQUIREMENTS
We here summarize the most important security features offered by 5G AKA, as explicitly identified in the formal evaluation of the scheme [9] , with corresponding references to the standard. 
D. WEAKNESSES IN THE CURRENT VERSION
We now summarize the main weaknesses in relation with the above described security requirements in order to overcome the existing attacks (cf. Section II), present in the current 5G AKA protocol.
• Exploiting the different failure reasons, MAC or Synchronisation, as identified by several authors [19] - [21] , can lead to tracking of targeted subscribers and thus can represent a major privacy threat, cf. Requirement 7.
• The SQN concealment mechanism is not sufficiently protected [22] , leading to leakage of the SQNs and thus allowing activity monitoring attacks, cf. Requirements 6,7.
• As noted in [10] , a successful key confirmation round is required after the execution of the protocol. In particular, the user should be ensured that the SN possesses the correct key material. The standard does not specify this additional key confirmation round, nor does it specify that the subscribers have to wait for it. This vulnerability can have serious consequences in two situations specified in the standard. First, SNs are able to initiate key change on the fly and are able to switch security contexts, including keys and parameters. Consequently, if the authentication is not fully verified by the UE, it can be possible that a malicious SN will be able to impersonate a legitimate SN, cf. Requirement 2.
• In the scenario where an attacker is able to compromise an SN, user privacy is completely broken. The malicious SN just needs to collect SUCI authentication requests of the UEs and then capture at a later stage the Res parameter sent by the UE over an insecure channel. Combining both the data (SUCI , Res) and sending it to the HN, results in the retrieval of the SUPI. Although, cf. Requirement 5, confidentiality of SUPI is only required under passive attacks, it is also important to consider active attacks, taking into account the realistic threat of it as mentioned before.
IV. PROPOSED PROTOCOL
We first describe the design rationale and go then into a more deep description of the newly proposed protocol.
A. DESIGN RATIONALE
The proposed protocol is designed in such a way that the changes with respect to the original version are minimal, but are able to address the four mentioned weaknesses above.
• In order to address the first two weaknesses, we propose a variant of the protocol where SQNs are replaced by random numbers. Earlier, strong random number generation was not possible on the USIM, but in the current generation this is not an issue anymore. Current USIMs can perform randomized asymmetric encryption operations. Random numbers are now also included in the initial authentication request of the SN and the corresponding response of the subscriber. Based on these random numbers, a new random number is generated at the HN and used for the derivation of the final authentication parameters. As a consequence, there is no different failure message to be sent regarding synchronization failure, avoiding abuse in either tracking possibilities or activity revelations.
Another advantage of removing the SQNs is that desynchronisation attacks between user and HN by sending several authentication requests either to user or to HN are now prohibited. Such de-synchronisation attacks decrease the availability and lower user friendliness.
• To avoid the last two weaknesses, we propose to include a mechanism at the UE allowing to verify the validity of the authentication response, coming both from SN and HN (not only HN as in current version). Moreover, the SN receives from the HN encrypted information of the SUPI and the keys, which can be decrypted thanks to information sent from the UE after successfully approving the authentication mechanism by the UE. Consequently, this allows to shorten the current version of the protocol with additionally two phases (between HN and SN). Moreover, the key confirmation round is not required anymore, cf. weakness 4.
We now explain the process more into detail. There are two main phases, being the initialization phase and the actual authentication phase. In the authentication phase, we can distinguish another three steps. Figure 3 also depicts the different phases and steps.
B. INITIALISATION PHASE
In the initialization phase, the SN starts sending besides its name also a random number R 1 . Note that this is different compared to the standard, where no random value is included in the initial request. Upon arrival of this request, the UE chooses another random value R 2 and performs asymmetric encryption on the SUPI, along with the two random values R 1 , R 2 and SN Name . The combination of the output of this encryption, together with the identity of the HN now forms the new SUCI, which is sent to the SN as response on the authentication request. The SN forwards the SUCI together with its name and the random parameter R 1 to the HN.
Upon arrival of the message with the HN, after decryption of the SUCI, the HN can immediately verify the validity of the request, both with respect to session (R 1 ) as with the intended entities (UE by SUPI and SN by SN Name ).
We further note that in addition, the random value R 2 , is not sent in clear text and unknown to the SN and any passive attacker. It takes over the role of the sequence number from the AKA protocol and will be used to construct the final key material.
C. AUTHENTICATION PHASE
This phase starts after verifying the validity of the request by the HN, as explained above. Also the corresponding symmetric key K of the user is retrieved. We now distinguish three major steps, according to the entity performing the computations
1) ACTIONS PERFORMED BY HN
After such positive verification, the HN derives a new parameter O, based on the input of the random parameters R 1 and R 2 , defined by UE and SN respectively. In order to send the confirmation to the UE about the validity of the SN, the HN derives xMAC = f 1 (K , (O, SN Name )). Next, the HN derives two other parameters xRes, hxRes, which are later used in the protocol by the UE to prove to the SN that it is the legitimate user. This follows from the fact that the UE is the only user that is able to compute xRes and by sharing hxRes (a hash value on xRes) with the SN, it can also demonstrate that later on. Finally the session key K SEAF is derived, based on input VOLUME 7, 2019 only known by the UE. The HN sends the session key and SUPI, which are encrypted in the message EK by means of the parameter xRes. Consequently, it is up to the UE to activate the session key and to release its identity to the SN later on in case of successful authentication. As a result the message xMAC, hxRes, EK is sent to the SN, who forwards further xMAC to the UE.
2) ACTIONS PERFORMED BY UE
Upon arrival of xMAC, the user starts computing O and f 1 (K , O, SN Name ). If this result does not equal to the received xMAC parameter, the session is immediately aborted. Else, the UE computes Res and K SEAF . The value Res is sent to the SN.
3) ACTIONS PERFORMED BY SN
Upon arrival of the value Res, the SN verifies if SHA256(R 1 , Res) equals to the stored parameter hxRes. If so, it uses Res as decryption key to derive both the identity of the user and the session key.
V. NON-MONOTONIC LOGIC-BASED VERIFICATION
Following the literature, this section presents a nonmonotonic logic-based verification proof for verifying the proposed scheme. The non-monotonic logic is also known as RUBIN logic. We chose RUBIN logic as this method is very close to actual implementation of the protocol. For more details, the reader may refer to [28] , [29] , [30] .
A. BACKGROUND OF RUBIN LOGIC
Rubin logic integrates protocol analysis with specification and uses the notions of global sets, local sets, and actions, as follows.
1) GLOBAL SET
The Global Set comprises of various sets that are required to represent information in the protocol. The content of the global sets may change as the protocol run is progressed. Moreover, these sets are public to each principal in a protocol specification.
1) Principal Set: This set contains the principals who participate in a protocol. 2) Rule Set: This set contains inference rules for deriving new statements from existing assertions. 3) Secret Set: This set contains all the secrets that exist at any given time in the system. 4) Observer set: This set contains all principals who possibly know the secrets by listening to network traffic.
2) LOCAL SET
A Local Set comprises of various sets that are private to each participant. The local sets consist of the following: 1) Possession set (P i ): This set holds all the data relevant to security, known or in possession of an entity, which includes encryption keys, public keys, and other secrets that are not publicly available. We represent the possession set by POSS(P i ) = (poss 1 sees from messages sent across the network and it also contains a copy of the information as the Observer set. 4) Behavior list (P i ): This is a list of elements, which are ordered. BL = AL, bev 1 , bev 2 , . . . bev n , here AL is an action list, which consists of zero or many actions executed by P i and bev k is a pair, i.e., (message, AL). Note that these messages represent basically two types: Send (P i , message) and Receive (P i , message). Furthermore, after every Send(.) operation, the Observer set has to be updated using the Update(.) operation. After each Update(.) operation the control passes to the next Receive(.) operation of principal, which is specified in the earlier Send(.) operation.
5) Haskeys set (P i ):
The Haskeys set holds keys that P i sees, either as they are in the initial possession set, or as they appear in a message sent across the network and are added to the Seen set of P i .
3) ACTIONS
Actions are important operations, which are utilized in the protocol specification. The actions are required to control the state of knowledge and possessions for evolved entities. For example, how a principal constructs messages, performs hash and concatenation operations, encryption and decryption, etc. Considering our requirements, following actions are defined as shown in Table 1 .
4) INFERENCE RULES
We defined the inference rules that are required as per our requirements. Note that these rules are directly adopted from [28] . Moreover, in order to understand the inference rules, few notation are adopted: X contain Y: Y appears as a sub-message of X; S:= F(S) : S is replaced by the value of F(S); X from P: X is received from P; and LINK(N): this formula basically links a response to a challenge (e.g., if a principal generates nonce) then N is added to belief set of the principal [28] . 1) Message-meaning rule:
Origin rule:
3) Sub-message origin rule: • POSS(SN) = {R1, SUCI , SN name } • BEL(SN) = {R1} In this case, the global sets remain unchanged and so the secret set is the same.
Upon receiving the message from SN, HN performs the actions in BL (HN) on R1, SN Upon receiving the message from HN, SN performs the actions (SN8) and (SN9) in BL(SN). It sends xMAC to UE and updates its own table. Now, the local sets of SN are changed as follows.
• POSS(SN) = {R1, SUCI , SN name }, {xMAC, hxRes, EK } from HN
• BEL(SN) = {R1, hxRes, EK } In this case, the global sets remain unchanged and so the secret set is the same.
After the actions (SN8) and (SN9) are finished, the (UE6)-(UE10) actions are performed to verify MAC and challenge. If the conditions are not true then the system will be aborted. Otherwise, the (UE11) action computes K SEAF and the (UE12) action sends Res to SN. Finally, UE updates its own table, and the local sets of UE are changed as follows.
• POSS(UE) = {K , R2, SUPI , Pr HN , ID HN , xMAC, hxRes, EK , K SKAF }
• BEL(UE) = {K , K SKAF , LINK (R2, R1)} Now the global sets are modified as follows:
Observer(K): {UE} Observer(R1, R2, O): {UE} Observer(K SEAF ): {UE} Upon finishing the action (UE12), the actions (SN10)-(SN12) are performed in BL(SN) with incoming message (Res). In action (SN11), if hxRex is not verified then the system will be aborted. Otherwise, the action (SN12) and (SN13) are executed to obtain SUPI , K SEAF and to update its own table with (SUPI , K SEAF , Res), respectively. Finally, the local sets of SN are changed as follows.
• POSS(SN) = {SUPI , xMAC, hxRes, EK , K SKAF } • BEL(SN) = {SUPI , K SKAF } Now the global sets are modified as follows:
Observer(SUPI): {SN} Observer(K SEAF ): {SN} This verification implies that:
• R2 and O are fresh for each session, and are known by the legitimate UE and HN.
• K is only known to UE and HN.
• UE, SN, and HN are mutually authenticated during the protocol execution.
• SUPI is only possessed by the UE, HN and SN.
• The session key K SEAF is only possessed by the UE, HN and SN. Note that K SEAF is an independent key for each session as it is computed over O (i.e., using random numbers). This also implies that if a long term key is compromised then the past session cannot be determined. Hence, it achieves forward secrecy. Likewise, it also achieves the post-compromised security. This verifies the security claims for the proposed scheme.
VI. DISCUSSION ON PROPOSED PROTOCOL
We first discuss the differences between the proposed protocol and the current standard AKA protocol and why the identified weaknesses of AKA do not hold in our proposed protocol. Then we discuss the overall security strength, followed by some additional security features that our protocol is able to offer.
A. DIFFERENCES WITH AKA PROTOCOL
A key confirmation round is not needed in the proposed protocol because of the following reasons.
• The HN can verify the uniqueness of the session in time and bound to the entities SN and UE, thanks to the fact that the parameter SUCI also contains the random value R 1 and SN Name .
In the current AKA protocol, in case of an impersonation attack on the SN, the UE and the HN are not aware of any problem unless a key confirmation round is performed [10] . Consequently, it is much more interesting to build such protection already from the beginning of the protocol.
• Due to the integration of SN Name , R 1 , R 2 in the MAC parameter, the UE can link the validation with the original session. Note that in the AKA protocol, the MAC parameter does not involve any info related to the SN, and again the UE and the HN are not aware of any problem unless a key confirmation round is performed [10] .
• The SN can only activate the session key and the identity of the subscriber after receiving a positive response of the UE with parameter Res, who checked the validity of the session. As a consequence, the UE is sure that only the legitimate SN (the one verified by the HN) is able to derive its identity and session key. In the AKA protocol, the parameter Res was used to request the SUPI of the HN, without binding this request to one of the parameters used in the session. As a consequence, it is very easy to impersonate an SN in this way. The usage of sequence numbers is not only impractical, requires more storage, but also leads to several vulnerabilities, like possibility of activity monitoring attacks or even traceability of a targeted subscriber. Therefore, we replaced these numbers by random numbers. However, the main reason to use sequence numbers in AKA was to avoid replay attacks. Consequently, we explicitly need to check resistance against replay attacks. Resistance is obtained because of the following reasons. − The key material EK , hxRes, xMAC, established by the HN, is bound to a fixed session, determined by the initial parameters R 1 and R 2 , independently defined by SN and UE respectively.
− The response Res of the UE is linked to the same session as it includes the parameters R 1 and R 2 .
B. OVERALL SECURITY STRENGTH
We now discuss the strength of our protocol against the seven most important security requirements, defined in the standard and described in Section III-C.
• First of all, with respect to authentication (Requirements 1-3), thanks to the session binding of the UE with the SN in the SUCI message, the inclusion of the SN name in the MAC parameter, and the encrypted session key at the SN, mutual authentication is obtained in a direct way, i.e. without the need of an additional key confirmation round.
• Confidentiality on K SEAF (Requirement 4) is obtained after a successful authentication of the UE as the UE shares at the end of the protocol the symmetric key to decrypt the previously received message of the HN containing the session key.
• Confidentiality of SUPI (Requirement 5) is now also achieved under active attacks (instead of only passive attacks as indicated in the standard) since it is treated in the same way as the session key (see Requirement 4).
• Confidentiality of SQN (Requirement 6) is no longer relevant as we do not use a parameter indicating the frequency of authentication requests.
• Protection against anonymity and unlinkability (Requirement 7) is now also achieved under active attacks (instead of only passive attacks as indicated in the standard) since it is related to the confidentiality of the SUPI, which is only released at the end of a successful authentication protocol by the authenticated SN. In case the authentication protocol is unsuccessful, the identity cannot be revealed.
C. ADDITIONAL SECURITY FEATURES
We distinguish, from a security point of view, at least two additional strengths, i.e. provide forward security and protection against exhaustive key search attack, of our proposed version, compared to the current 5G AKA protocol.
• Forward security means if the long-term secret (together with the party's current session key and all other secret states) is corrupted, then the past sessions are still secure as the previously established session keys cannot be revealed. Post-compromise security protects sessions against earlier compromise, i.e. if the long-term key (together with the party's current session key and all other secret states) is corrupted, the future messages can still be secure (if the previously corrupted party somehow becomes "clean" again) [31] . It is clear that both features are not established by the current version of the AKA protocol in case the longterm key material of the UE is leaked, being the symmetric key K , SQN and SUPI , since K SEAF is constructed based on these parameters together with the random value R sent over the insecure channel. These properties also hold if the database at the HN, storing all the secret key material of the different UEs is hacked. Instead, in our proposed scheme we are able to offer part of these features. There are two situations to distinguish: -The attacker is in possession of the key material of the UE. In this case, our proposed protocol is able to offer both forward and post compromise security as the session key is built using the ephemeral random variable R 2 , which is encrypted by means of the public key of the HN. Note that this can be a realistic scenario if the attacker for instance is capable in breaking the tamper proof resistant storage capabilities of the device. -The attacker is in possession of the key material of the HN, including its long term secret key. In this case, forward security is broken. However, postcompromise security is still obtained when only changing the private-public key pair of the HN since the SUPI (including its key material) is not revealed, unless in the last step of the protocol only by the SN. However, this last scenario is very unlikely to occur as both types of key material, private key and database with user data are stored and protected at different places.
• In an exhaustive key search attack, all possible values of the keys are tried. If an attacker collects in the current AKA scheme the variables (SN Name , R, Res) by eavesdropping on the insecure channel, it can verify the validity of a guessed value K * of K by checking if Challenge(K * , R, SN Name ) equals to Res. If some part of the key is leaked somehow, for instance by a certain side channel attack, the attack can become feasible. In our proposed scheme, the parameters xMAC, Res leaked in the insecure channel involve besides the secret key K , also the random variable R 2 . Consequently, the complexity of an exhaustive search attack is in this case drastically higher and thus infeasible, especially as R 2 changes in each collected pair.
VII. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
Let us compare the 5G AKA protocol with our proposed protocol, both from the point of view of computation and communication.
A. COMPUTATIONAL COMPLEXITY
With respect to computational complexity, we notice that in both protocols the same type and approximately the same amount of operations are performed. The most important noticeable differences are at the HN and SN. At the HN, there is a one way function to obtain O instead of a random generation of R and an additional symmetric key encryption to encrypt the session key and identity of the subscriber. At the SN, there is an additional symmetric key decryption. As both HN and SN are powerful servers, we can conclude that the resulting impact of these differences is negligible.
B. COMMUNICATION COMPLEXITY
The advantage of our protocol is most visible with respect to the communication complexity. We consider three different scenarios to clarify this statement.
• Successful authentication: In this scenario, the AKA protocol requires an additional communication phase between SN and HN compared to our protocol, followed by a key confirmation round. Although this key confirmation round is not specifically described (not mentioned in the standard), it should involve at least one communication round between SN and UE and SN and HN in order to overcome the third and fourth identified weakness respectively, as described in Section III-D.
• Invalid request of SN to HN: As we assume the existence of active attackers, it is possible that a malicious SN intercepts a legitimate SUCI message and forwards this to the HN, using its own name. In the AKA protocol, the complete protocol will still be executed. The HN will construct key material using the incorrect SN name, forward the material to the malicious SN, from which part of it is again forwarded to the UE. The UE needs to perform all the computations and transmit its response to the SN. Only during the key confirmation round, this will be noticed by the UE. In our proposed protocol, it will even not be possible to construct key material by the HN, which is not linked with the SN to which the UE wants to connect as the SUCI message inherently contains the SN name.
• Invalid request of SN to UE: As we assume the existence of active attackers, it is possible that a malicious SN intercepts a legitimate R, AUTN message in the current 5G AKA protocol and forwards this to the UE. In the AKA protocol, the UE still needs to perform all operations and will only notice the problem after the key confirmation round. With our proposed protocol the UE notices the problem and aborts the protocol in the MAC computation (second step).
VIII. CONCLUSION
This paper represents some fundamental changes to the current AKA protocol in order to address both well-known weaknesses and recently discovered weaknesses. An important change in the protocol is the replacement of the sequence numbers by random numbers. In addition, we give full control at the subscriber for releasing the identity and secret key session with the SN after a successful verification of data provided by the HN. As a consequence, this change provides also confidentiality of the SUPI and protection against anonymity and unlinkability, in the presence of active attackers, instead of only passive attacks as stated in the standard. The proposed protocol possesses less communication phases and does not require an additional key confirmation phase in order to ensure full authentication of all entities on the key material. The same amount of operations is required at the side of the UE, thus no additional complexity is imported. Moreover, there is no secure storage required of the sequence number and simple de-synchronisation attacks are avoided.
Consequently, we think our proposed protocol will be a good candidate to replace the current AKA protocol. As the main structure and type of operations are similar as in AKA, replacement would not involve too many changes.
